محمد طاہر ۔۔۔

یہ نواے وقت کے پرنٹ پیپر میں شائع ہوا ہے

اتوار ، 30 اگست ، 2009

۔۔۔انتہائی ادب سے عرض ہے جسونت سنگھ کی کتاب کامل سچائی کو بیان کرتی ہے اور نہ ہی کوئی نیا موقف پیش کرتی ہے ان کی
تصنیف ’’جناح : بھارت، تقسیم آزادی‘‘ مختلف تاریخی واقعات سے دو نتائج اچھالتی ہے۔٭ محمد علی جناح ہندو مسلم اتحاد کی علامت تھے اور سیکولر رہنما تھے۔٭ تقسیم ہند کے ذمہ دار جناح نہیں بلکہ نہرو پٹیل اور کانگریس جماعت تھی۔قائداعظم ہندو مسلم اتحاد کی علامت تھے مگر ان کے سیکولر ہونے سے کیا مراد ہے اور خود یہ سیکولرازم کیا شے ہے؟ جس اصطلاح کا درست اردو ترجمہ تک دستیاب نہیں‘ مقتدرہ کے پاس بھی نہیں، بھارت میں سیکولرازم کے معانی ومفاہیم کی اپنی ایک ست رنگی ہے جسے برہمن مزاج ایک حال اور ڈھال کے طور پر بوقت ضرورت استعمال میںلاتا ہے تاکہ وہاں کی کثیرالقوامی مستقل اکائیوں کو ترنگے تلے رکھا جائے اسی مزاج کی یہ بھی ضرورت ہے کہ قائداعظم محمد علی جناح کو ایک سیکولر رہنما کے طور پر پیش کیا جائے تاکہ پاکستان کا مستقل وجود دو قومی نظریے کے مقدس سائبان سے باہر نکالا جا سکے۔ درحقیقت دو قومی نظریہ مسلمانوں کے وجود کیساتھ جڑا ہوا ہے جس کا مقصد کسی دوسری قوم کو سرنگوں یا پامال کرنانہیں بلکہ خود مسلمان کی مذہبی تاریخی اور تہذیبی ضرورت کی تکمیل کرنا ہے۔ یہ ایک مکمل اختیاری نظریہ ہے جسے ہندوؤں نے اپنی تنگ نظری اور تعصب سے مسلمانوں کیلئے ایک اضطراری مسئلہ بنا دیا۔ قائداعظم محمد علی جناح اس اختیاری نظریے اور اضطراری مسئلے کے درمیان ایک فطری تعلق بن کر مطلع تاریخ پر نمودار ہوئے وہ جسونت سنگھ کی کتاب کی ضرورت کو پورا نہیں کررہے تھے بلکہ تاریخ کے تدریجی ارتقاء میں صورت پذیر ہورہے تھے انہیں ایک عہد کے موقف کی قید میں رکھ کر جانچا اور پرکھا نہیں جاسکتا۔ ایسے تمام نتائج سیاسی ضرورتوں کو پورا کرتے ہیں تاریخی تقاضوں کو نہیں قائداعظم ہندو مسلم اتحاد کی علامت ایک متعین دور میں یقیناً رہے۔ تب بلبل ہند کہلاتی سروجنی نائیڈو نے انہیں ہندو مسلم اتحاد کا سفیر قرار دیا مگر جسونت سنگھ کچھ اور کہہ رہے ہیں۔محمد علی جناح 1945تک ہندو مسلم مسائل کو فرقہ پرستی کی نگاہ سے دیکھنے کے بجائے اسے قومی مسئلہ سمجھ کر حل کرنے کی کوشش کرتے رہے۔‘‘ بظاہر یہ نہایت مثبت پیرایہ اظہار ہے، مگر نہیں، اس میں تاریخی مغالطہ آرائی ہے۔ قائداعظم ہندو مسلم مسئلے کو فرقہ پرستی کی نگاہ سے ہرگز نہیں دیکھتے تھے مگر اسے قومی مسئلہ سمجھ کر بھی نہیں دیکھتے تھے بلکہ وہ دو قومی مسئلہ سمجھ کر اسے جانچتے تھے فرق صرف یہ ہے کہ 1945ء سے پہلے وہ ایک اور حل کو قبول کرنے کیلئے تیار تھے مگر 1945 کے بعد وہ دوسرے حل کی طرف متوجہ ہوئے گویا ہندو مسلم مسئلے کی نوعیت اور ادراک کے حوالے سے قائداعظم کی فکر ہر دور میں یکساں اور یک رنگ ہی رہی البتہ اسکے حل میں مختلف ادوار کی عملی ضرورتوں کا وہ قدرے لحاظ کرتے رہے یہ نکتہ یہیں واضح ہونا چاہیے کہ قائداعظم جب بھی ہندو مسلم اتحاد پر زور دیتے تو اس سے مراد فرقہ وارانہ اتحاد (جیسا کہ جسونت سنگھ کہتے ہیں) نہیں بلکہ دو قومی اتحاد تھا۔ دو قومی اتحاد جس میں ایک قوم دوسری سے متصادم حالت میں نہ ہو تب بھی مختلف اور منفرد ضرور ثابت ہوتی ہے گویا ہندو مسلم مسائل کا دو قومی اتحاد کے تناظر میں حل ڈھونڈنے کے متعین عرصے میں بھی ان کی دو قومی نظریے سے دوری نہیں جھلکتی کسی بھی دور میں نہیں۔ جہاں تک جسونت سنگھ کے اس نتیجے کا تعلق ہے کہ تقسیم ہند کے ذمہ دار جناح نہیں بلکہ نہرو پٹیل اور کانگریس جماعت تھی۔ تو اس میں وہ منفرد نہیں۔ بھارت کے ہندو مورخین بھی اس کا اعتراف کرتے آئے ہیں، ایس کے مجومدار بھی ان میں سے ایک ہیں اس نتیجے میں یہ باور کیا جاتا ہے کہ قائداعظم دراصل ہندو مسلم مسئلے کو قومی مسئلہ سمجھ کر حل کرنا چاہتے تھے مگر نہرو پٹیل اور کانگریس نے انہیں ایسا نہیں کرنے دیا۔ چنانچہ قائداعظم مایوس ہو کر ایک آزاد مملکت کو حل کی طرف متوجہ ہوئے۔ گویا مسلمانوں کی علیحدہ مملکت انکی آزاد منشاء کا نتیجہ نہیں بلکہ مایوسی کی پیداوار ہے۔ یہ تاریخ کی ایک غلط تعبیر ہے۔ قائداعظم مایوس ہو کر تبدیل نہیں ہوئے یہ ایک تدریجی عمل تھا ‘جسے ٹھیک اس طرح ظاہر ہونا تھا وہ ہندو تنگ نظری اور برہمن بالادستی کی حقیقت دنیا پر بے نقاب کرنا چاہتے تھے اس لئے ہندو مسلم مسئلے کے مشترکہ حل کی ہرکوشش میں شریک ہوتے۔ قائداعظم کے سوانح نگار اسٹنیے ولپرٹ نے بالکل درست تفہیم کی۔’’ (وہ قائداعظم) 1920میں کانگریس پر اپنا اعتماد کھو چکے تھے پھر ایک چوتھائی صدی بعد انہوں نے برطانیہ پر اعتماد کرنا اور اس سے امید کرنا ترک کردیا۔‘‘سوال یہ ہے کہ اسکے باوجود قائداعظم 1946ء میں کابینہ مشن کے تین اراکین اور ہندو رہنماؤں سے بات چیت کرتے کیوں نظر آتے ہیں جبکہ یہ مشن مسلمانوں پر ہندوؤں کی مستقل بالادستی کے علاوہ کچھ نہیں تھا۔ دراصل یہ آخری کیل تھی جو قائداعظم نے ہندو تعصب اور برطانوی جانبداری کو بے نقاب کرتے ہوئے ٹھونک دی تھی۔ یہاں تک کہ مولانا ابوالکلام آزاد کو تیس برس بعد منظر عام پر آنے والی اپنی کتاب ’’انڈیا ونس فریڈم‘‘ میں یہ اعتراف کرنا پڑا۔ ’’افسوس کیساتھ مجھے یہ کہنا ہوگا کہ یہ پہلا موقع نہیں تھا جب ہندو نے قومی مقصد کو زبردست نقصان پہنچایا۔‘‘ قائداعظم مایوس ہو کر ایک علیحدہ مملکت کی طرف راغب نہیں ہوئے، وہ اپنے ارادوں کو متشکل کرنے والے عظیم رہنماؤں میں سے تھے، واقعات کے بہاؤ میں بہنے والوں میں سے نہیں۔ کنتی مسحور کن حیرتیں ماضی کی چمکدار روشنیوں اور آج کے المناک اندھیروں سے جھانکتی ہیں کانگریس کیخلاف شکایتیں بڑھنے لگیں تو گاندھی پریشانی میں قائداعظم سے ملاقات کیلئے بے تاب ہوئے۔ انہوں نے انکار کردیا تب گاندھی نے ایک خط میں انہیں لکھا کہ وہ ممبئی میں موجود ان کی اقامت گاہ پر خود حاضر ہونے کو تیار ہیں۔ بالآخر اپریل 1938 میں ساڑھے تین گھنٹے پر محیط ملاقات سے گاندھی مایوس اٹھے یہاں تک کہ جواہر لال نہرو کو خط میں لکھا:’’میں کام کررہا ہوں مگر یہ خیال میرے لئے تکلیف دہ ہے کہ میں نے خود پر وہ اعتماد کھودیا ہے جو ایک ماہ پہلے تک مجھ میں تھا۔‘‘یہ ہیں قائداعظم محمد علی جناح، انہیں نہرو اور پٹیل کہاں دھکیل سکتے تھے وہ خود تاریخ کے صفحات پر ہندو رہنماؤں کو عریاں کرنا چاہتے تھے اور برہمن سامراجیت کے خواب کو چکنا چور بھی۔ جسونت سنگھ کی کتاب میں کچھ مثبت اعتراضات ضرور ہیں مگر بھارت میں اس کیخلاف ردعمل ایک مختلف معاملہ ہے جسے بی جے پی کی اندرونی کشاکش اور بھارتی سیاست میں پیدا ہونیوالے نئے پیچ وخم کے تناظر میں دیکھا جارہا یہ دلچسپ بحث آئندہ۔!

ExxonMobil in talks with local vendors for $1billion IT contracts

BANGALORE: World’s biggest oil company ExxonMobil is in talks with India’s top technology firms and multinational vendors for outsourcing of several IT contracts worth up to $1 billion. A day after British Petroleum (BP) formally awarded over $1.5-billion outsourcing contracts to TCS, Infosys and Wipro along with IBM and Accenture, top Indian offshore vendors including L&T Infotech and HCL Technologies - along with other MNC vendors - have locked horns with each other for almost $1-billion outsourcing deal being fleshed out by ExxonMobil. In a year where large outsourcing customers are seeking to reduce their operational costs by up to 30%, Indian technology firms are set to gain from increased offshoring of application development, maintenance and support. “The discussions are at an early stage. However, ExxonMobil wants to work with fewer, large and medium-sized vendors at lower rates,” said a US-based person familiar with ExxonMobil’s outsourcing strategy. He requested anonymity because he is not authorised to speak with media. Exxon runs on SAP platform across the company’s chemical and oil businesses spread over 200 countries with nearly 80,000 employees. Large oil, gas and utility firms such as Royal Dutch Shell, Chevron, ExxonMobil and BP run their business processes powered by complex ERP software from SAP and Oracle. At a time when their operational and functional heads are demanding lower operational costs, outsourcing and offshoring of ERP maintenance and support is gaining momentum. Research firm Gartner says the economic turbulence is a major catalyst for outsourcing of ERP systems and services. For instance, BP expects to save $500 million over five years by reducing the number of its suppliers to five from around 40 and sending more projects to be delivered from cheaper offshore locations such as India.

Swedish Journalist on Israeli organ harvesting

Donald Bostrom

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WZxyD931dEQ

The Most Religious Race: Islam in Europe

Reflections on the Revolution in Europe: Immigration, Islam, and the West

By Christopher Caldwell

Christopher Caldwell has written a very bad book. His argument is internally inconsistent, his history is distressingly selective, and his terminology is uncritically general. Unsurprisingly, the book is Islamophobic. More unexpectedly, he has presented something anti-Semitic; the book’s passion for Israel is of a kind with the bigot who is very much in favor of other cultures, so long as he does not have to bump into them anywhere in “his” country.

But in full, his Reflections most reminded me of those imperial British bureaucrats who could not reconcile their contempt for Islam with their envious admiration of its alleged qualities: brute and irrational, yet sensual and virile. It is sufficiently telling that Caldwell cites Michel Houellebecq’s The Elementary Particles, “describing the waves of cultural anxiety and sexual insecurity” felt by a white European teacher whose intellectual achievements mean nothing to his classes; his crush on a female student is unreturned, because she prefers the attention of a “a macho African student,” a “baboon.”

Christopher Caldwell has also written a disquieting book, which anyone interested in Islam or Europe simply must read. As a columnist for the Financial Times, writer for the New York Times Magazine and senior editor at the Weekly Standard, Caldwell’s reactions to the global processes that have provoked massive population flows and undermined the hegemony of the nationalist narrative are fascinating.

That he prefers argument by culture, metaphysics, and identity reveals a deep anxiety among even the most privileged, a sign that capital and its inherent desire to destabilize have unmoored and unsteadied every part of the world. We should take any such argument seriously, especially for the almost existential helplessness it admits. Caldwell fears the dilution of an ideal Europe, whose countries had and should have distinct yet interchangeable cultures, all equally incompatible with a Muslim culture that should have never been allowed into Europe. Hence his book; warning Europe of the threat posed by mass Muslim immigration, legitimated by elites who never consulted their populations on whether they wanted so many foreigners among them in the first place. Caldwell believes that Islam has now established itself, like a persistent, radioactive sludge, in every nook and cranny of an aging, brittle Europe, and cannot be erased. (Islam, apparently, has a very long half-life.)

What we are to do with this information, I do not know. I suspect Caldwell hasn’t the least idea, either: “When an insecure… culture meets a culture that is anchored… it is generally the former that changes to suit the latter.” Missing something “hard to define,” Europeans, insufficiently committed to any value system as a result of their own unchecked individualism, are ripe for conquest. The conquerors-in-waiting are Europe’s marginalized Muslims. That is not the only thing that is “hard to define,” let alone hard to believe. Caldwell never explains the terms and concepts on which his alarm depends. How does Islam have the power to infiltrate Europe when it is not even an agent? Why should we believe that underperforming minorities could dominate countries with the world’s highest standards of living? What is Europe, anyway? Is it the European Union, or, as his title also suggests, the West? When was Europe a happy land of monotony, free of pesky minorities, indulging in its unchanging cultural preferences, such as—I kid not—pea soup? Why is this essentialized Europe incapable of growing to accept Muslims, and why do Muslims have neither the right nor the ability to integrate?

As an American, I have every right to ask, for his assumption that Muslims cannot be Westerners assumes my commitments are fraudulent. He is in effect calling me, and millions like me, liars.

The “Disaster” of Muslim Immigration

Caldwell makes numerous basic errors throughout his book; it would be unfair to allow his mistakes to pass uncorrected. Caldwell describes the Muslim world as a “basket case,” and to prove his point, he recycles numerous statistics about Arab backwardness. A writer for the Financial Times, Caldwell should understand that if fewer than one in five Muslims is Arab then, ipso facto, Islam is not isomorphic with Arabness.

He describes the “vanquished enemy” of World War II as racist, although many of the vanquishers were structurally racist themselves. When describing large-scale Algerian immigration into France, he blames the violence of the “Algerian revolution,” though who or what Algeria was revolting against is evidently immaterial. Reinhard Schulze clarifies: the French military visited a comparable level of death and destruction on Algeria as affected Germany in World War II. This fact could explain why so many Algerians were so eager to get out of Algeria, if Caldwell only bothered to share it. But in the service of communicating a deep cultural unease with rapid social change, Caldwell has attempted to provide a veneer of neutral correctness (he has, in effect, internalized the multiculturalism he professes to so detest.)

When it comes to immigration, Caldwell is at his shoddiest—and, unfortunately for us, that is his theme. Over and over, we are told that Muslim immigration to Europe is different. While immigration between European countries is healthy and positive, Muslim immigration to Europe is disastrous. Unbelievably, Caldwell argues that there is no difference between Europeans (read: white Christian Europeans) moving between EU member-states and New Yorkers heading out for California. Except, of course, that New York and California never fielded armies against one another.

Then again, if Europe could leave historic animosities behind—and it did—Caldwell’s argument has little weight. Caldwell anxiously digs himself a deeper hole: He distinguishes Hispanic immigration to America from Muslim immigration to Europe, arguing that the former does not represent the intrusion of an alien culture. (Tell that to the right-winger for whom the Hispanic promises to implode America.) Since Hispanics correspond to a more culturally conservative West from a few decades back, it will not be hard for Hispanics (mere antiquated Westerners) to be assimilated. Islam, on the other hand, “is in no sense Europe’s religion and it is in no sense Europe’s culture.” Halfway through the book, however, he tells us that Turkish attitudes to marriage are deeply similar to European attitudes from just “a very few decades ago.” Surely the stuff great arguments are made of.

Ultimately, Muslims are a danger because, all insistence aside, Caldwell is a racist who has translated religion into a set of unchangeable and interchangeable believers. He believes there are no meaningful differences among Muslims; at one point, he even underlines the point by noting that although Volvos are not Volkswagens, both are still cars (and of European manufacture, I might add)—another example of Caldwell’s argumentative impotence.

Not only are Muslims indistinguishable, which is the religious equivalent of the racist assumption that all colored folk look (or talk, or think, or dream, or smell) alike, these Muslims are all opposed to the West, incapable of change, and opposed to democracy. Let us consider these three points sequentially.

That Muslims are all opposed to the West is nonsense: America’s Muslim community is culturally Western, politically active, and socially dynamic. Two of our Congressmen are African-American Muslims—are they opposed to the West? I have met numerous European Muslims committed to their countries of residence and deeply shaped by those cultures. (One such acquaintance, a candidate for British Parliament from Glasgow, represents the Scottish National Party.) That Muslims are incapable of change is similarly inaccurate. I will let Caldwell disprove himself on this point. He observes that Turkey has democratized over the past decades, and this partway explains the more confident role Islam plays in Turkish culture. Is that not a change?

That Muslims are all opposed to democracy, absolutely central to Caldwell’s polemic, is belied by the unhelpful fact that the majority of the world’s Muslims live in democracies: Mali, Turkey, Lebanon, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Indonesia, among other countries, with 700 million Muslims; more than half the planetary total.

The Counterinsurgency in Pakistan

By Kamran Bokhari and Fred Burton

Since the start of the U.S.-jihadist war in late 2001, and particularly since the rise of the Taliban rebellion within its own borders in recent years, Pakistan has been seen as a state embroiled in a jihadist insurgency threatening its very survival. Indeed, until late April, it appeared that Pakistan was buckling under the onslaught of a Taliban rebellion that had consumed large chunks of territory in the northwest and was striking at the country’s core. A Shariah-for-peace deal with the Taliban in the Swat region, approved with near unanimity by the parliament, reinforced the view that Pakistan lacked the willingness or capability to fight Islamist non-state actors chipping away at its security and stability.

In the last three months, however, the state has staged a dramatic comeback, beginning with an offensive in Swat and adjacent districts that has resulted in the state regaining control over most of the affected areas. (The offensive is still under way.) The government action in Swat was followed by limited air and ground operations in the South Waziristan region, along with an intelligence campaign in cooperation with the United States, which has resulted in a two-month respite from any major insurgent suicide bombings. Most important was the killing Aug. 5 of top Pakistani Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud in a bombing strike by a U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle.

While many observers still view Pakistan as a state beset by a jihadist insurgency, the government’s counterinsurgency campaign has clearly taken center stage. This does not mean that the jihadists no longer constitute a threat. They are and will remain a significant threat for the foreseeable future, but the state has recently gained the upper hand in the struggle — at least for now.

What Changed and How

This dramatic change begs the question: How was the government of Pakistan able to turn the situation around? This is an important question given the complex and historic relationship between the country’s security establishment and Islamist militants of various stripes. This relationship has long prevented the state from taking decisive action — even in the face of a growing threat to the state’s integrity. The first stirrings of the change can be traced back to the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks in November 2008, which brought Pakistan to the brink of war with India at a time when Islamabad was also facing a raging insurgency at home.

The dual security threats from domestic and foreign jihadists, coupled with political instability and an economy on the verge of collapse, created intense pressure on the Pakistani state. This pressure led to a consensus within the military-intelligence establishment that regaining control over Islamist militants was critical to the survival of the country. After aligning with Washington in the war against the jihadists, Islamabad had gradually lost control of Islamist militant groups it had previously backed as instruments of foreign policy in dealing with Afghanistan and India. (Islamabad had even helped create some of these groups.) While Pakistan was trying to balance its need to maintain influence over these groups with its obligations to the Americans in the U.S.-led war against jihadists, many of these groups, to varying degrees, moved into al Qaeda’s orbit.

The first order of business for Islamabad was to deal with renewed pressure from Washington and defuse tensions with New Delhi in order to avoid war. This required going after rogue elements of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) — aka Jamaat-ud-Dawah (JuD) — which, Pakistan acknowledged, masterminded the Mumbai attacks. Because LeT/JuD had morphed over the years into a wider social phenomenon in Pakistan, isolating the rogues from the mainstream group has been no easy task, evidenced by the fact that the effort is still under way.

Getting tough with LeT/JuD required the military-intelligence leadership to make further personnel changes within the country’s premier spy service, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate, a process that had been under way since army chief Gen. Ashfaq Kayani appointed the current ISI director-general, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, in September 2008. Dozens of ISI officials were replaced, and under its new leadership the directorate played a lead role in the crackdown on rogue members of LeT/JuD. However, the state’s need to deal with the crisis triggered by the Mumbai attacks and focus on the LeT/JuD problem provided the Pakistani Taliban the time and space to further entrench themselves in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP).

Pakistan was able to ward off the threat of war with India but, in the process, the Pakistani Taliban assumed a more menacing posture. The crackdown against LeT/JuD was useful in that it was the first major move against a former proxy — an experience that paved the way for a wider campaign against Taliban forces in Swat and FATA. If Pakistan could no longer allow LeT/JuD (a group that it was not at war with) to use the country as a staging ground for attacks against India, it certainly could not tolerate the Pashtun jihadists and their Punjabi allies who were waging an open rebellion on Pakistani soil.

The stakeholders in Islamabad had begun to realize that there was no alternative to fighting the Taliban rebels, but this, too, was a daunting task. Clearly, Islamabad was not capable of waging an all-out assault against the entire rebel movement, for this entailed battling multiple groups in multiple theaters. A lack of consensus within the state and a dearth of support from the Pakistani public for such an initiative meant that a major offensive would only make matters worse.

For one thing, there was the risk of exacerbating the situation in cases where Taliban groups that were not fighting Islamabad could align with the likes of Mehsud and Maulana Fazlullah (leader of the Taliban group in Swat). The fear of turning more and more Pashtuns into Taliban served as a major arrestor, preventing the state from taking meaningful action beyond limited successes achieved by Frontier Corps-led security forces in the FATA’s Bajaur agency. These considerations, and the need to buy time, led to negotiations with the Taliban group in Swat that resulted in the peace deal.

Emboldened by their victory in establishing a Taliban emirate in the greater Swat region, the Taliban group there decided to push farther eastward, sending its fighters into Buner district and demanding that Shariah be imposed not just in the greater Swat region but also in the entire country. In fact, the lead negotiator on behalf of the Swat Taliban, Maulana Sufi Muhammad, declared the Pakistani Constitution un-Islamic and those who opposed Shariah infidels. Meanwhile, the suicide-bombing campaign of the Mehsud-led Taliban group, which targeted mostly security forces in major cities like Islamabad and Lahore, had generated widespread public outrage.

The move on the part of the Swat Taliban to try and project power beyond their turf proved to be the turning point where the state finally realized it needed to take a firm stand against the rebels. It was at that time, in late April, that the government embarked on Operation Rah-i-Rast with the goal of eliminating the Taliban stronghold in the Swat region. Though the offensive was limited to Swat and its adjacent districts, the state took advantage of the budding public opinion against the jihadists and launched a major media campaign against “Talibanization” that proved extremely useful. It was also very timely, given the fact that more than 2 million residents of the greater Swat region were displaced from their homes during the government offensive, and this could well have undermined public support for the operation.

In the three and a half months since the Swat offensive began, the government hassuccessfully cleared Taliban fighters from most of the region. Indeed, the Swat Taliban network has been disrupted and its war-making machine degraded to the point where it no longer has the capability to regain control over the area — though the leadership is still at large, which means a low-intensity conflict will continue to simmer for some time. Security forces are likely to remain in the area for at least two years and there reportedly are plans to build a permanent military garrison in Swat for the first time.

In early June, after its initial success in Swat, the military turned its attention to the country’s largest jihadist hub — South Waziristan — where it knew it couldn’t stage a major offensive along the lines of what it was doing in Swat. The hostile terrain — both physical and human — coupled with its status as an autonomous region and the government’s lack of troops, forced the state to combine limited air and ground attacks with intelligence operations to isolate Mehsud and his Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan movement from the wider Taliban phenomenon.

In the midst of this campaign, the ISI, working in coordination with the CIA, was able to eliminate Mehsud, under whose leadership the Pakistani Taliban went from being a low-level militancy in South Waziristan to being a broad insurgent movement throughout the FATA, large parts of the NWFP and in parts of the core province of Punjab. Mehsud’s death has initiated a power struggle among his associates for control of his group that Islamabad is trying hard to exploit.

Where to From Here?

Between the re-taking of most of Swat, which has allowed for the return of some 765,000 displaced residents, and the elimination of Mehsud, Pakistan has gained an important edge in its struggle against its Taliban rebels that it can build upon to deliver a decisive blow. But there are a lot of moving parts in play that have to be dealt with in order to ensure continued progress.

Though the Swat Taliban have been damaged, they have not been entirely defeated, which will not happen until their leadership is captured or killed (or until they cannot recruit new fighters from their madrassas). And as displaced residents return to the region, a massive amount of reconstruction and development work is necessary to prevent unrest that the Taliban could exploit. Restoring the writ of the state entails the re-establishment of political administration and local law enforcement, and there are other areas in the NWFP — especially the districts that run parallel to the FATA — that also need to be brought back under government control.

In Waziristan and the rest of the FATA, Mehsud’s death has wounded the Taliban, but they are very much entrenched in the region, along with their al Qaeda and other transnational allies. Any counterinsurgency campaign in the tribal areas is going to be exponentially more difficult than the offensive in Swat. This is why the military is now aligning itself with pro-Pakistani tribal and militant forces to try and root out thosewaging war against the state. Being able to distinguish between those militants hostile to Pakistan and those focused on Afghanistan is going to be hard not only because of the fluidity of the Taliban phenomenon but also because it complicates U.S.-Pakistani relations.

Then there is the matter of how Islamabad balances its efforts to re-assert state control over areas on its side of the border with an international move to talk to the Taliban in Afghanistan. The challenge for Pakistan is to regain influence in its western neighbor by reviving its contacts and thus influence with the Afghan Taliban while rolling back Talibanization in its own Pashtun areas. Efforts to neutralize FATA-based domestic rebels impacts Taliban groups focused on Afghanistan, whose support Pakistan needs to crush the domestic insurgency and re-establish its influence in Afghanistan.

While Pakistan’s Pashtun areas are most affected by Talibanization, the phenomenon has made considerable inroads into Pakistan’s core, where the Taliban, like the LeT/JuD, manifest themselves more as social movement. This is why, in addition to the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism campaign, Pakistan has also begun focusing on anti-extremism and de-radicalization efforts — the ideological battle — which is designed to drain the swamp in which the jihadists are able to grow and operate. While Pakistani public opinion has turned against the Taliban in a meaningful manner, there are still significant pockets of social support and a large number of people who remain ambivalent about the need for a comprehensive campaign against the jihadists.

Pakistan’s ability successfully to press ahead with this multidimensional effort depends on its ability to contain political instability within tolerable limits and improve economic conditions. While the judicial crisis ended with the reinstatement of the chief justice fired by former President Pervez Musharraf, political stability remains elusive because of the country’s fragmented political landscape and the weakness of its civilian institutions. And while a loan from the International Monetary Fund has helped Pakistan avoid bankruptcy, it will be some time before the economic conditions begin to improve to the point where Islamabad is able to meet its routine financial obligations and pay the multibillion-dollar cost of fighting the Taliban.

This report is republished in this blog with attribution to www.stratfor.com

Why Are We In Afghanistan?

Don't ask Stephen Biddle – or, on second thought, please do ask him.
by Justin Raimondo,
Why are we fighting in Afghanistan? Well, it’s hard to say, because the rationale for our intervention keeps shifting: first it was to banish al-Qaeda from the region – although, of course, Osama bin Laden & Co. haven’t been seen in those parts since 2001, when we fumbled an attempt to corner them in the mountains of the Hindu Kush. Now, however, our war aims seem to have changed: according to Stephen Biddle, a civilian advisor to the commander of US troops at the Afghan front, Gen. Stanley McChyrstal, it’s to keep Pakistan in line, prevent Islamabad from becoming a terrorist “haven” – and keep that country’s nukes out of al-Qaeda’s hands.
Such a nightmare scenario isn’t very likely, says Biddle in an essay published in The American Interest, and the rationale for the war itself is “a close call,” although, he avers, “still worth it.” But why and how is it worth it – and, more importantly, to whom is it worth it?

We’ll get to that later, but first let’s examine Biddle’s argument in favor of the Afghan war – if, indeed, it can be called an argument in favor at all. Because he’s unusually honest about the real stakes involved, and on account of his position as an advisor to McChrystal, what he has to say is fascinating from the perspective of an opponent of US intervention.
Biddle dispenses with the “we must deny al-Qaeda a safe haven” argument – raised repeatedly by President Obama” – with admirable swiftness. Yes, he avers, we must make sure al-Qaeda doesn’t reassert its presence in Afghanistan,
“But the intrinsic importance of doing so is no greater than that of denying sanctuary in many other potential havens—and probably smaller than many. We clearly cannot afford to wage protracted warfare with multiple brigades of American ground forces simply to deny al-Qaeda access to every possible safe haven. We would run out of brigades long before bin Laden ran out of prospective sanctuaries.”
Indeed, if we take the logic of the “no safe haven” doctrine to its ultimate conclusion, then we must be willing to occupy the entire world – anywhere al-Qaeda could possibly find a “safe haven.” Something tells me such a strategy isn’t going to be all that workable – although I’m glad no one suggested it to the Bush administration, because they would probably have jumped at the chance to implement it.
No, says Biddle, the real reason we must invade and occupy Afghanistan for the next forty years or so is because of … Pakistan! As he puts it:
“The more important U.S. interest is indirect: to prevent chaos in Afghanistan from destabilizing Pakistan. With a population of 173 million (five times Afghanistan’s), a GDP of more than $160 billion (more than ten times Afghanistan’s) and a functional nuclear arsenal of perhaps twenty to fifty warheads, Pakistan is a much more dangerous prospective state sanctuary for al-Qaeda.
“Furthermore, the likelihood of government collapse in Pakistan, which would enable the establishment of such a sanctuary, may be in the same ballpark as Afghanistan, at least in the medium to long term. Pakistan is already at war with internal Islamist insurgents allied to al-Qaeda, and that war is not going well. Should the Pakistani insurgency succeed in collapsing the state or even just in toppling the current civilian government, the risk of nuclear weapons falling into al-Qaeda’s hands would rise sharply. “
Oh, but wait:
“The United States is too unpopular with the Pakistani public to have any meaningful prospect of deploying major ground forces there to assist the government in counterinsurgency. U.S. air strikes can harass insurgents and terrorists within Pakistan, but the inevitable collateral damage arouses harsh public opposition that could itself threaten the weak government’s stability. U.S. aid is easily (and routinely) diverted to purposes other than countering Islamist insurgents, such as the maintenance of military counterweights to India, graft and patronage, or even support for Islamist groups seen by Pakistani authorities as potential allies against India. U.S. assistance to Pakistan can—and should—be made conditional on progress in countering insurgents, but if these conditions are too harsh, Pakistan might reject the terms, thus removing our leverage in the process. Demanding conditions that the Pakistani government ultimately accepts but cannot reasonably fulfill only sets the stage for recrimination and misunderstanding.”
Okay, let’s see if I get this straight: the real problem is Pakistan, not Afghanistan. However, we can’t go into Pakistan because we’re hated there, and the very act of intervening could and would give al-Qaeda the kind of momentum it needs to overthrow the Pakistani government. And we can’t even pressure the Pakistanis to crack down on the Islamists who may be sympathetic to al-Qaeda, because they can’t do it, and our insisting on it would only lead to hard feelings and “misunderstanding.”
Okay, I get it. So, please tell me: why are we in Afghanistan?
Well, I was just getting to that, if you’ll be patient. According to Biddle,
“This is the single greatest U.S. interest in Afghanistan: to prevent it from aggravating Pakistan’s internal problems and magnifying the danger of an al-Qaeda nuclear-armed sanctuary there.”
Oh, but never mind that, because, you see,
“Afghanistan’s influence over Pakistan’s future is important, but it is also incomplete and indirect. A Taliban Afghanistan would make a Pakistani collapse more likely, but it would not guarantee it. Nor does success in Afghanistan guarantee success in Pakistan: There is a chance that we could struggle our way to stability in Afghanistan at great cost and sacrifice, only to see Pakistan collapse anyway under the weight of its own elite misjudgments and deep internal divisions.”
So, where does this leave us? On the one hand, we have to be in Afghanistan because of our concern for Pakistan’s security – but the latter could disintegrate in any event, and, indeed, it could do so in large part due to our efforts.
Hmmmmm. A real conundrum here. So what’s left of the rationale for the Afghan war?
Well, not a lot. We are left to imagine a chain reaction of events, including the downfall of the Karzai government and its replacement with the Taliban, the downfall of the secular government in Islamabad and its replacement by some sort of Islamist regime sympathetic to al-Qaeda, and, finally, the capture of Pakistan’s nukes by Al Qaeda, aided and abetted by the Taliban and the newly-installed Islamists – a scenario Biddle admits is not likely. Nevertheless,
“During the Cold War, the United States devoted vast resources to diminishing an already-small risk that the USSR would launch a nuclear attack on America. Today, the odds of U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan yielding an al-Qaeda nuclear weapon next door in Pakistan may be relatively low, but the low risk of a grave result has been judged intolerable in the past and perhaps ought to be again. On balance, the gravity of the risks involved in withdrawal narrowly make a renewed effort in Afghanistan the least-bad option we have.”
Actually, the chances of a nuclear first strike by the Russians was a lot higher than is the highly unlikely prospect of a nuclear-armed al-Qaeda nuking New York from some Central Asian launching pad — first ,because al-Qaeda has yet to acquire nukes, and secondly because Pakistan’s nukes are well-guarded. Thirdly, and most importantly, Biddle’s analysis of the risks of inaction is seriously flawed by his one-sided emphasis on the alleged “gravity” of a given risk.
It would certainly pose a grave danger to the planet earth if we were invaded by a race of intelligent reptiles from Regulus: on the gravity scale I would give it a ten. Yet the likelihood of such an event is practically zero, and therefore expending resources on prevention would be sheer waste. There are other, far more probable threats lurking on the horizon. Such as the threat of al-Qaeda obtaining nuclear materials from, say, Russian organized crime gangs, who looted nuclear facilities in the last days of the Soviet regime, and took advantage of the chaos to spirit away the makings of a very dirty bomb. If al-Qaeda was about to take control of Pakistan, and its nukes, we would have plenty of warning: not so with the deployment of a dirty nuke, the elements of which have been assembled in secret and put in position just as the hijackers were put in position to do what they did on 9/11. This is the real threat, emanating not from any state actors but from a stateless, transnational insurgency that operates outside the parameters of warfare as we have known it. Rather than fighting on the battlefield, they burrow beneath it and emerge like Myrmidons from the very soil, our own soil, to wreak destruction on a mass scale.

Andrew Bacevich made the same point in a recent essay for Commonweal, arguing that those who say “the fight in Afghanistan is essential to keeping America safe” overlook
“The primary reason why the 9/11 conspiracy succeeded: federal, state, and local agencies responsible for basic security fell down on the job, failing to install even minimally adequate security measures in the nation’s airports. The national-security apparatus wasn’t paying attention—indeed, it ignored or downplayed all sorts of warning signs, not least of all Osama bin Laden’s declaration of war against the United States. … So we let ourselves get sucker-punched. Averting a recurrence of that awful day does not require the semipermanent occupation and pacification of distant countries like Afghanistan. Rather, it requires that the United States erect and maintain robust defenses.”
The campaign mantra of the Obama-ites was that the Iraq war was a diversion: the real battle against al-Qaeda, declared candidate Obama, needs to be fought in Afghanistan. The reality is that both Iraq and Afghanistan are diversions away from the looming threat posed by a terrorist group that has shown it can penetrate our defenses and strike the continental United States, swiftly and without warning.
Biddle’s essay, meant as a defense of military efforts in the region, is woefully unconvincing because the author is himself undecided when it comes to answering the question posed in his title: “Is It Worth It?” Summarizing the problems – and problematic contingencies – surrounding the Afghan campaign, Biddle writes: “taking all this into account, advocates for withdrawal from Afghanistan certainly have a case.”
Wading through the ambiguities of Biddle’s”on the one hand this, on the other hand that” case for invading and occupying Afghanistan for the next few decades – at enormous cost, both in lives and American tax dollars – one has to ask: is this all there is? Even the top advisor to the commander of our Afghan forces is hard-pressed to come up with a convincing rationale for a war guaranteed to be protracted, costly, and highly uncertain as to its ultimate outcome. No wonder the American people are turning against it.
This business about al-Qaeda somehow taking control of Pakistan’s nukes is a fantasy, but if fear of a nuclear-armed Osama bin Laden is going to lead us into invading and occupying entire countries, then neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan qualify as the prime candidate. The chances of al-Qaeda acquiring a nuke from somewhere in the former Soviet Union – where loose nukes are floating around like autumn leaves in a forest – are far greater than this rather far-fetched Pakistan-goes-Islamist scenario. So why don’t we invade one of those former Soviet republics, say, Kazakhstan, where they might possibly pick up “lost” nukes from some criminal gang?
Well, I’d better stop there – after all, I don’t want to give the Obama-ites any ideas, now do I?
So, let’s get back to our original question: how, why, and to whom is the Afghan war “worth it”?
A good deal of Biddle’s essay is concerned with the politics of the conflict and its impact on the domestic scene, particularly its reception in the court of US public opinion. According to him, Obama has already “put his stamp on” the conflict, he owns it, and so must defend it from Republican attack and popular discontent. It is a war, he says, that “skirts the margins of being worthwhile,” and the great danger is that a “bipartisan antiwar coalition” will arise as casualties mount. On the other hand, we are told, withdrawal poses dangers, too:
“Politically, it would commit the Administration to a policy now supported by only 17 percent of the electorate. It would play into the traditional Republican narrative of Democratic weakness on defense, facilitate widespread if ill-founded Republican accusations of the Administration’s leftist radicalism, and risk alienating moderate Democrats in battleground districts whose support the President will need on other issues. However bad the news may look if the United States fights on, withdrawal would probably mean a Karzai collapse and a Taliban victory, an outcome that would flood American TV screens with nightmarish imagery.”
What’s at stake isn’t just the national interest – it’s “the Democratic Party’s future—not to mention the nation’s.” That’s why thousands more must die, and billions must be wasted.In short, it’s all about politics – but not the politics of change. It’s the politics of “stay the course,” Obama-style. There’s the answer to the question that titles today’s column.
Given this rationale for the Afghan war, I’d like to see the following carved on the tombstone of each and every victim of this war: “He/she died for the future of the Democratic party.”

China should break up India: Chinese strategist

Almost coinciding with the 13th round of Sino-Indian border talks (New Delhi [ Images ], August 7-8, 2009), an article (in the Chinese language) has appeared in China captioned 'If China takes a little action, the so-called Great Indian Federation can be broken up' (Zhong Guo Zhan Lue Gang, www.iiss.cn, Chinese, August 8, 2009).
Interestingly, it has been reproduced in several other strategic and military Web sites of the country and by all means, targets the domestic audience. The authoritative host site is located in Beijing and is the new edition of one, which so far represented the China International Institute for Strategic Studies (www.chinaiiss.org).

Claiming that Beijing's 'China-Centric' Asian strategy, provides for splitting India, the writer of the article, Zhan Lue (strategy), has found that New Delhi's corresponding 'India-Centric' policy in Asia, is in reality a 'Hindustan centric' one. Stating that on the other hand 'local centres' exist in several of the country's provinces (excepting for the UP and certain northern regions), Zhan Lue has felt that in the face of such local characteristics, the 'so-called' Indian nation cannot be considered as one having existed in history.

According to the article, if India today relies on any thing for unity, it is the Hindu religion. The partition of the country was based on religion. Stating that today nation states are the main current in the world, it has said that India could only be termed now as a 'Hindu religious state'. Adding that Hinduism is a decadent religion as it allows caste exploitation and is unhelpful to the country's modernisation, it described the Indian government as one in a dilemma with regard to eradication of the caste system as it realises that the process to do away with castes may shake the foundation of the consciousness of the Indian nation.

The writer has argued that in view of the above, China in its own interest and the progress of Asia, should join forces with different nationalities like the Assamese, Tamils, and Kashmiris and support the latter in establishing independent nation-States of their own, out of India. In particular, the ULFA (United Liberation Front of Asom) in Assam, a territory neighboring China, can be helped by China so that Assam realises its national independence.

The article has also felt that for Bangladesh, the biggest threat is from India, which wants to develop a great Indian Federation extending from Afghanistan to Myanmar. India is also targeting China with support to Vietnam's efforts to occupy Nansha (Spratly) group of islands in South China Sea.

Hence the need for China's consolidation of its alliance with Bangladesh, a country with which the US and Japan are also improving their relations to counter China.

It has pointed out that China can give political support to Bangladesh enabling the latter to encourage ethnic Bengalis in India to get rid of Indian control and unite with Bangladesh as one Bengali nation; if the same is not possible, creation of at least another free Bengali nation state as a friendly neighbour of Bangladesh, would be desirable, for the purpose of weakening India's expansion and threat aimed at forming a 'unified South Asia'.

The punch line in the article has been that to split India, China can bring into its fold countries like Pakistan, Nepal and Bhutan, support ULFA in attaining its goal for Assam's independence, back aspirations of Indian nationalities like the Tamils and Nagas, encourage Bangladesh to give a push to the independence of West Bengal and lastly recover the 90,000 sq km territory in southern Tibet.

Wishing for India's break-up into 20 to 30 nation-States like in Europe, the article has concluded by saying that if the consciousness of nationalities in India could be aroused, social reforms in South Asia can be achieved, the caste system can be eradicated and the region can march along the road of prosperity.

The Chinese article in question will certainly outrage readers in India. Its suggestion that China can follow a strategy to dismember India, a country always with a tradition of unity in diversity, is atrocious, to say the least. The write-up could not have been published without the permission of the Chinese authorities, but it is sure that Beijing will wash its hands out of this if the matter is taken up with it by New Delhi.

It has generally been seen that China is speaking in two voices -- its diplomatic interlocutors have always shown understanding during their dealings with their Indian counterparts, but its selected media is pouring venom on India in their reporting. Which one to believe is a question confronting the public opinion and even policy makers in India.

In any case, an approach of panic towards such outbursts will be a mistake, but also ignoring them will prove to be costly for India.

D S Rajan, is Director, Chennai Centre for China Studies.

http://www.rediff.com/news/2009/aug/10china-should-break-up-india-suggests-chinese-strategist.htm

Hypothesizing on the Iran-Russia-U.S. Triangle

A Net Assessment Re-examined
At STRATFOR, we proceed with what we call a “net assessment,” a broad model intended to explain the behavior of all players in a game. Our net assessment of Iran had the following three components:

Despite the rhetoric, the Iranian nuclear program was far from producing a deliverable weapon, although a test explosion within a few years was a distinct possibility.
Iran essentially was isolated in the international community, with major powers’ feelings toward Tehran ranging from hostile to indifferent. Again, rhetoric aside, this led Iran to a cautious foreign policy designed to avoid triggering hostility.
Russia was the most likely supporter of Iran, but Moscow would avoid becoming overly involved out of fears of the U.S. reaction, of uniting a fractious Europe with the United States and of being drawn into a literally explosive situation. The Russians, we felt, would fish in troubled waters, but would not change the regional calculus.
This view — in short, that Iran was contained — remained our view for about three years. It served us well in predicting, for example, that neither the United States nor Israel would strike Iran, and that the Russians would not transfer strategically significant weapons to Iran.

A net assessment is a hypothesis that must be continually tested against intelligence, however. The “Death to Russia” chant could not be ignored, nor could Ahmadinejad’s trip to Moscow.

As we probed deeper, we found that Iran was swirling with rumors concerning Moscow’s relationship with both Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Little could be drawn from the rumors. Iran today is a hothouse for growing rumors, and all our searches ended in dead ends. But then, if Ahmadinejad and Khamenei were engaging the Russians in this atmosphere, we would expect rumors and dead ends.

Interestingly, the rumors were consistent that Ahmadinejad and Khamenei wanted a closer relationship to Russia, but diverged on the Russian response. Some said the Russians already had assisted the Iranians by providing intelligence ranging from Israeli networks in Lebanon to details of U.S. and British plans to destabilize Iran through a “Green Revolution” like the color revolutions that had ripped through the former Soviet Union (FSU).

Equally interesting were our Russian sources’ responses. Normally, they are happy to talk, if only to try to mislead us. (Our Russian sources are nothing if not voluble.) But when approached about Moscow’s thinking on Iran, they went silent; this silence stood out. Normally, our sources would happily speculate — but on this subject, there was no speculation. And the disciplined silence was universal. This indicated that those who didn’t know didn’t want to touch the subject, and that those who did know were keeping secrets. None of this proved anything, but taken together, it caused us to put our net assessment for Iran on hold. We could no longer take any theory for granted.

All of the foregoing must be considered in the context of the current geopolitical system. And that is a matter of understanding what is in plain sight.

Potential Russian Responses to Washington
The U.S.-Russian summit that took place after the Iranian elections did not go well. U.S. President Barack Obama’s attempt to divide Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and Russian Prime Minister Putin did not bear fruit. The Russians were far more interested in whether Obama would change the FSU policy of former U.S. President George W. Bush. At the very least, the Russians wanted the Americans to stop supporting Ukraine’s and Georgia’s pro-Western tendencies.

But not only did Obama stick with the Bush policy, he dispatched U.S. Vice President Joe Biden to visit Ukraine and Georgia to drive home the continuity. This was followed by Biden’s interview with The Wall Street Journal, in which he essentially said the United States does not have to worry about Russia in the long run because Russia’s economic and demographic problems will undermine its power. Biden’s statements were completely consistent with the decision to send him to Georgia and Ukraine, so the Obama administration’s attempts to back away from the statement were not convincing. Certainly, the Russians were not convinced. The only conclusion the Russians could draw was that the United States regards them as a geopolitical cripple of little consequence.

If the Russians allow the Americans to poach in what Moscow regards as its sphere of influence without responding, the Russian position throughout the FSU would begin to unravel — the precise outcome the Americans hope for. So Moscow took two steps. First, Moscow heated up the military situation near Georgia on the anniversary of the first war, shifting its posture and rhetoric and causing the Georgians to warn of impending conflict. Second, Moscow increased its strategic assertiveness, escalating the tempo of Russian air operations near the United Kingdom and Alaska, and more important, deploying two Akula-class hunter-killer submarines along the East Coast of the United States. The latter is interesting, but ultimately unimportant. Increased tensions in Georgia are indeed significant, however, since the Russians have decisive power in that arena — and can act if they wish against the country, one Biden just visited to express American support.

But even a Russian move against Georgia would not be decisive. The Americans have stated that Russia is not a country to be taken seriously, and that Washington will therefore continue to disregard Russian interests in the FSU. In other words, the Americans were threatening fundamental Russian interests. The Russians must respond, or by default, they would be accepting the American analysis of the situation — and by extension, so would the rest of the world. Obama had backed the Russians into a corner.

When we look at the geopolitical chessboard, there are two places where the Russians could really hurt the Americans.

One is Germany. If Moscow could leverage Germany out of the Western alliance, this would be a geopolitical shift of the first order. Moscow has leverage with Berlin, as the Germans depend on Russian natural gas, and the two have recently been working on linking their economies even further. Moreover, the Germans are as uneasy with Obama as they were with Bush. German and American interests no longer mesh neatly. The Russians have been courting the Germans, but a strategic shift in Germany’s position is simply not likely in any time frame that matters to the Russians at this juncture — though the leaders of the two countries are meeting once again this week in Sochi, Russia, their second meeting in as many months.

The second point where the Russians could hurt the Americans is in Iran. An isolated Iran is not a concern. An Iran with a strong relationship to Russia is a very different matter. Not only would sanctions be rendered completely meaningless, but Iran could pose profound strategic problems for the United States, potentially closing off airstrike options on Iranian nuclear facilities.

The Strait of Hormuz: Iran’s Real Nuclear Option
The real nuclear option for Iran does not involve nuclear weapons. It would involve mining the Strait of Hormuz and the narrow navigational channels that make up the Persian Gulf. During the 1980s, when Iran and Iraq were at war, both sides attacked oil tankers in the Persian Gulf. This raised havoc on oil prices and insurance rates.

If the Iranians were to successfully mine these waters, the disruption to 40 percent of the world’s oil flow would be immediate and dramatic. The nastiest part of the equation would be that in mine warfare, it is very hard to know when all the mines have been cleared. It is the risk, not the explosions, which causes insurance companies to withdraw insurance on vastly expensive tankers and their loads. It is insurance that allows the oil to flow.

Just how many mines Iran might lay before being detected and bringing an American military response could vary by a great deal, but there is certainly the chance that Iran could lay a significant number of mines, including more modern influence mines that can take longer to clear. The estimates and calculations of minesweepers — much less of the insurers — would depend on a number of factors not available to us here. But there is the possibility that the strait could be effectively closed to supertankers for a considerable period. The effect on oil prices would be severe; it is not difficult to imagine this aborting the global recovery.

Iran would not want this outcome. Tehran, too, would be greatly affected by the economic fallout (while Iran is a net exporter of crude, it is a net importer of gasoline), and the mining would drive the Europeans and Americans together. The economic and military consequences of this would be severe. But it is this threat that has given pause to American and Israeli military planners gaming out scenarios to bomb Iranian nuclear facilities. There are thousands of small watercraft along Iran’s coast, and Iran’s response to such raids might well be to use these vessels to strew mines in the Persian Gulf — or for swarming and perhaps even suicide attacks.

Notably, any decision to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities would have to be preceded by (among other things) an attempt to neutralize Iran’s mine-laying capability — along with its many anti-ship missile batteries — in the Persian Gulf. The sequence is fixed, since the moment the nuclear sites are bombed, it would have to be assumed that the minelayers would go to work, and they would work as quickly as they could. Were anything else attacked first, taking out the Iranian mine capability would be difficult, as Iran’s naval assets would scatter and lay mines wherever and however they could — including by swarms of speedboats capable of carrying a mine or two apiece and almost impossible to engage with airpower. This, incidentally, is a leading reason why Israel cannot unilaterally attack Iran’s nuclear facilities. They would be held responsible for a potentially disastrous oil shortage. Only the Americans have the resources to even consider dealing with the potential Iranian response, because only the Americans have the possibility of keeping Persian Gulf shipping open once the shooting starts. It also indicates that an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities would be much more complex than a sudden strike completed in one day.

The United States cannot permit the Iranians to lay the mines. The Iranians in turn cannot permit the United States to destroy their mine-laying capability. This is the balance of power that limits both sides. If Iran were to act, the U.S. response would be severe. If the United States moves to neutralize Iran, the Iranians would have to push the mines out fast. For both sides, the risks of threatening the fundamental interests of the other side are too high. Both Iran and the United States have worked to avoid this real “nuclear” option.

The Russian Existential Counter
The Russians see themselves facing an existential threat from the Americans. Whether Washington agrees with Biden or not, this is the stated American view of Russia, and by itself it poses an existential threat to Russia. The Russians need an existential counterthreat — and for the United States, that threat relates to oil. If the Russians could seriously threaten the supply of oil through the Strait of Hormuz, the United States would lose its relatively risk-free position in the FSU.

It follows from this that strengthening Iran’s ability to threaten the flow of oil, while retaining a degree of Russian control over Iran’s ability to pull the trigger, would give Russia the counter it needs to American actions in the FSU. The transfer of more advanced mines and mining systems to Iran — such as mines that can be planted now and activated remotely (though most such mines can only lay, planted and unarmed, for a limited period) to more discriminating and difficult-to-sweep types of mines — would create a situation the Americans could neither suppress nor live with. As long as the Russians could maintain covert control of the trigger, Moscow could place the United States, and the West’s economies, in check.

Significantly, while this would wreak havoc on Persian Gulf producers and global oil consumers at a time when they are highly vulnerable to economic fluctuations, a spike in the price of oil would not hurt Russia. On the contrary, Russia is an energy exporter, making it one of the few winners under this scenario. That means the Russians can afford much greater risks in this game.

We do not know that the Russians have all this in mind. This is speculation, not a net assessment. We note that if Russo-Iranian contacts are real, they would have begun well before the Iranian elections and the summit. But the American view on Russia is not new and was no secret. Therefore, the Russians could have been preparing their counter for a while.

We also do not know that the Iranians support this Russian move. Iranian distrust of Russia runs deep, and so far only the faction supporting Ahmadinejad appears to be playing this game. But the more the United States endorses what it calls Iranian reformists, and supports Rafsanjani’s position, the more Ahmadinejad needs the Russian counter. And whatever hesitations the Russians might have had in moving closer to the Iranians, recent events have clearly created a sense in Moscow of being under attack. The Russians think politically. The Russians play chess, and the U.S. move to create pressure in the FSU must be countered somewhere.

In intelligence, you must take bits and pieces and analyze them in the context of the pressures and constraints the various actors face. You know what you don’t know, but you still must build a picture of the world based on incomplete data. At a certain point, you become confident in your intelligence and analysis and you lock it into what STRATFOR calls its net assessment. We have not arrived at a new net assessment by any means. Endless facts could overthrow our hypothesis. But at a certain point, on important matters we feel compelled to reveal our hypothesis not because we are convinced, but simply because it is sufficiently plausible to us — and the situation sufficiently important — that we feel we should share it with the appropriate caveats. In this case, the stakes are very high, and the hypothesis sufficiently plausible that it is worth sharing.

The geopolitical chessboard is shifting, though many of the pieces are invisible. The end may look very different than this, but if it winds up looking this way, it is certainly worth noting.

How to ensure freedom from future shock

1: Charting the course of inclusive growth

The engine of the Indian economy has been chugging along very well. In the seven years since the beginning of the decade, the country has achieved an impressive transformation. But the larger question is whether the pace of change is quick enough to lift more and more people out of mind-numbing poverty. The Strategic Foresight Group had conducted a study called ‘Rethinking India’s Future’ in 2002. The results were startling, demonstrating clearly why the motto of inclusive growth can’t remain just another fancy slogan.

We relied on a new format for categorising parts of the economy. Instead of income factors, we divided the economy into three kinds based on consumption: the business class, bike class and bullock-cart class. Business class includes people who have cars, computers, washing machines, credit cards and who occasionally travel by plane. The bike class are the people who have proper housing, television and telephone, can travel by train, but can’t yet afford personal computers or fly by plane. Typically, they ride on motorbikes. And then there is the bullock cart class, comprising people who are effectively outside the market for consumer durables and most modern facilities.

Between 2001 and 2007, about 100 million people have moved up from the bullock cart economy to bike class and even to business. The lowest strata declined from 83% to 76% of the population. The good news is that this is among the highest rates of transformation globally. The bad news: it may not still be good enough. In the same period, the country’s population jumped by 120 million. The net result: the proportion of people in the bullock cart economy remained more or less the same at about 850 million. It doesn’t take much to explain why the number of districts under the influence of Naxalism increased from 60 in 1996 to 160 now.

Fast forward to 2025. By then, India’s population could reach as much as 1.35 billion. Even if we achieve a growth rate of 7%-9% every year, 60% of the people will still remain in the bullock cart economy. That is about 800 million poor people. But it is not merely a question of poverty. It would be an open invitation for people to embrace Naxalism, separatism, crime and terrorism.

However impressed the world might be, a transformation rate of 100 million in six years is not adequate for India. We need to double the rate to 200 million. This will make it possible for almost a billion people to belong to the business and bike economy by 2025. It will change the scenario of despair into a picture of hope, dissuading the remaining 350 million bullock carters from choosing destructive options.

But the transformation is real hard business, especially if two critical social development indicators — health and education — defy resolution. Now, half the children below the age of five suffer from malnourishment. When these children become workers in 2025, half of India’s labour force will be unhealthy.

Now consider the dismal statistics on education. While primary school enrolment rate is expected to touch 100% in the next 5 to 10 years, the problem lies in the ensuing high drop-out rate. Today, only 35% of those who enroll at the primary level complete secondary school or equivalent.

This means 65% of those joining the labour force are not even matriculates. So while economic growth will throw up opportunities, large masses of people will be unable to exploit them. The problem of providing employment to a labour force of 600 million, with half of them in poor health and two-thirds without higher secondary school education, is going to be daunting in 2025.

Among top U.S. fears: A failed Pakistani and Mexican state

By Bernd Debusmann

WASHINGTON — What do Pakistan and Mexico have in common? They figure in the nightmares of U.S. military planners trying to peer into the future and identify the next big threats.

The two countries are mentioned in the same breath in a just-published study by the United States Joint Forces Command, whose jobs include providing an annual look into the future to prevent the U.S. military from being caught off guard by unexpected developments.

"In terms of worst-case scenarios for the Joint Force and indeed the world, two large and important states bear consideration for a rapid and sudden collapse: Pakistan and Mexico," says the study - called Joint Operating Environment 2008 - in a chapter on "weak and failing states." Such states, it says, usually pose chronic, long-term problems that can be managed over time.

But the little-studied phenomenon of "rapid collapse," according to the study, "usually comes as a surprise, has a rapid onset, and poses acute problems." Think Yugoslavia and its disintegration in 1990 into a chaotic tangle of warring nationalities and bloodshed on a horrific scale.

Nuclear-armed Pakistan, where Al Qaeda has established safe havens in the rugged regions bordering Afghanistan, is a regular feature in dire warnings. Thomas Fingar, who retired as the chief U.S. intelligence analyst in December, termed Pakistan "one of the single most challenging places on the planet."

This is fairly routine language for Pakistan, but not for Mexico, which shares a 2,000-mile, or 3,200-kilometer, border with the United States.

Mexico's mention beside Pakistan in a study by an organization as weighty as the Joint Forces Command, which controls almost all conventional forces based in the continental United States, speaks volumes about growing concern over what is happening south of the U.S. border.

Vicious and widening violence pitting drug cartels against each other and against the Mexican state have left more than 8,000 Mexicans dead over the past two years. Kidnappings have become a routine part of Mexican daily life. Common crime is widespread. Pervasive corruption has hollowed out the state.

In November, in a case that shocked even those (on both sides of the border) who consider corruption endemic in Mexico, the former drug czar Noé Ramírez was charged with accepting at least $450,000 a month in bribes from a drug cartel in exchange for information about police and anti-narcotics operations.

A month later, a Mexican army major, Arturo González, was arrested on suspicion that he sold information about President Felipe Calderón's movements for $100,000 a month. González belonged to a special unit responsible for protecting the president.

Depending on one's view, the arrests are successes in a publicly declared anticorruption drive or evidence of how deeply criminal mafias have penetrated the organs of the state.

According to the Joint Forces study, a sudden collapse in Mexico is less likely than in Pakistan, "but the government, its politicians, police, and judicial infrastructure are all under sustained assault and pressure by criminal gangs and drug cartels. How that internal conflict turns out over the next several years will have a major impact on the stability of the Mexican state."

It added: "Any descent by Mexico into chaos would demand an American response based on the serious implications for homeland security alone."

What form such a response might take is anyone's guess, and the study does not spell it out, nor does it address the economic implications of its worst-case scenario. Mexico is the third biggest trade partner of the United States (after Canada and China) and its third-biggest supplier of oil (after Canada and Saudi Arabia).

No such ties bind the United States and Pakistan. But the study sees a collapse there not only as more likely but as more catastrophic.

It would bring "the likelihood of a sustained violent and bloody civil and sectarian war, an even bigger haven for violent extremists and the question of what would happen to its nuclear weapons. That 'perfect storm' of uncertainty alone might require the engagement of U.S. and coalition forces into a situation of immense complexity and danger." The study then warns of "the real possibility that nuclear weapons might be used."

It is not clear where on the long list of actual and potential crises around the world Mexico and Pakistan will rank once Barack Obama takes office as U.S. president on Jan. 20. During the election campaign, Obama repeatedly criticized Pakistan for not cracking down hard enough on terrorists inside its borders.

Since then a new Pakistani president has come to power. Not long after that, tensions between Pakistan and India, also a nuclear power, rose sharply after gunmen attacked two luxury hotels and other sites in Mumbai, India's commercial capital, and killed 163 people. India described the attack as a conspiracy hatched in Pakistan and carried out by Pakistanis.

Closer to home, the U.S. economic crisis looks likely to slow down a $1.4 billion assistance program - including military equipment, training, technology - to help the Mexican government gain the upper hand over the drug cartels and re-establish control over what some have called "failed cities" along the border, places where shootouts, beheadings and kidnappings have become routine.

It would take a very rosy outlook on the future to expect rapid progress.

Challenges and Implications for future Joint Force

Download complete report,

click here: http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2008/JOE2008.pdf