A Loss of Faith in Afghanistan

First State of the Union Address 2010.


By ERIK MALMSTROM
Tonight, President Obama presented a compelling defense of his strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Following my deployment to the northeastern region of the country in 2006-2007, I arrived at many of the same conclusions as he has over recent months. I believed that the faltering mission required a revamped approach, more troops, and more resources. Dealing with the dysfunctions of the U.S.-led effort, serving in an overstretched unit and suffering casualties in my platoon prompted my initial diagnosis. However, time, distance, and perspective from my experience have forced me to reconsider this assessment.President Obama’s goals are sound. Training Afghan security forces, rewarding good governance, reducing corruption, supporting the rights of all Afghans, and strengthening the international coalition are vital to the fight against Al Qaeda. However, a fatal flaw plagues the counterinsurgency strategy adopted by the president: the more the U.S. and its allies deepen their involvement and commitment in Afghanistan, the more they undercut the Afghan sense of ownership, accountability and sustainability that will determine the long-term fate of the mission. Simply put, his strategy is directly at odds with his goals.
Most importantly, Mr. Obama’s plan lacks the most essential prerequisite to any successful counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan: a credible Afghan government. The Karzai regime is weak, corrupt, and perceived to be illegitimate by most Afghans. Similar problems hamper provincial, district, and village governments.
Last year’s fraudulent elections made this already bad situation even worse. By and large, Afghans have lost faith in the president, the current government and the democratic process. In my own experience, this lack of confidence was pervasive, palpable and deep-seated. It poisoned the very integrity of our mission.
Ironically, President Obama’s call for better governance ignores our own culpability for the sorry state of affairs in Afghanistan. Our mere presence has insulated the Karzai government from the consequences of its actions. It has enabled its corruption, laziness, and ineffectiveness. It has stunted the growth of the Afghan state, institutions, and civil society. At some point, Karzai must answer to his people for his dismal performance. In turn, the U.S. must prepare for the potential collapse of this government and plan for various contingencies.
In the end, this is an Afghan war that must be won or lost by Afghans. Thus, the true path to progress rests on thrusting the Afghan government in a position of genuine responsibility and relegating the U.S. and NATO to a supporting role. While the U.S. will be an important player in Afghanistan both now and in the future, one must be careful not to overstate the U.S. role and understate the Afghan role. Furthermore, one must understand that the U.S. presence undermines Afghan ownership of the conflict. Escalating this presence will only exacerbate this problem.
Furthermore, the U.S. and other NATO countries lack the domestic political support, money and resolve to escalate the war for more than a short period. Given this abbreviated timeline, any potential gains from the president’s strategy are likely to be ephemeral and superficial. In the coming years, the U.S. will likely find itself in a similarly poor situation if it fails to seriously recalibrate its strategy.

Erik Malmstrom served in northeastern Afghanistan in 2006-2007 as an infantry officer with the 10th Mountain Division. He is currently a graduate student at the Kennedy School of Government and Harvard Business School.