Isolating Islamists just won't work

By Rami G. Khouri

The news earlier this week was a sign of the times, and of the days ahead: the British government said it was resuming contacts with the political wing of Hizbullah, and the Obama administration said it was interested in exploring contacts with "moderates" among the Taliban in Afghanistan who might be separated from the extremists allied with Al-Qaeda.
These developments highlight a question that will surely prove to be a central issue in the months and years ahead: How do Western and other governments who see themselves as law-abiding, God-fearing, and righteous connect with, or even negotiate with, armed militant movements that defy, challenge and occasionally attack these governments' local allies and surrogates?
The Taliban and Hizbullah are two very different movements, reflecting diverse national contexts, aims, tactics and degrees of legitimacy. They are only two of dozens of other such groups around the Arab and Asian region that are viewed negatively and shunned by the United States, most other Western states, Israel, and many Arab countries, but enjoy substantial support in their own countries and around the region. Islamist groups, political parties, militias, rebel movements, tribal movements, insurgent forces, and occasional semi-criminal gangs traditionally had been strictly shunned or actively fought by the American-led camp that liked to speak of itself as the guardian of universal enlightened values. American presidents and other allies, clients and surrogates often said that groups like Hizbullah, Hamas, the Taliban, and even some shunned governments who wished to join "the civilized world" and the "community of nations" had to change their ways and stop opposing or fighting the US-led camp.
It is now obvious that this once strict policy of isolating and opposing Islamist and other militant groups until they unilaterally changed their ways has not worked, and will not work. One of the most important political lessons of the past decade or so has been the failure of sanctions and threats that aimed to change the policies of target movements or governments. Hamas, Hizbullah, Syria and Iran in particular have been targeted by the US, Israel, and elements of the European Union and the United Nations system; but they have largely ignored the sanctions and threats, and have persisted in their policies. The wisdom or stupidity of such a response will become ever more obvious. For the moment, all we can conclude is that punitive sanctions and threats do not work very well, and should be replaced by more effective approaches.

The initial signals from the Obama administration suggest it understands this and is probing for other means of dealing with or politically engaging governments and movements that it had traditionally confronted or tried to isolate. Obama himself has spoken of affirming "respect and mutual interests" as guiding principles for dealing with those whom the US sees as foes or mere troublemakers. This approach has elicited positive initial responses from some of those target groups, and it is very likely that we will see serious political discussions soon among the US, Syria and Iran.
While this shift in American and British attitudes is positive, sensible and to be applauded, the lingering danger is that some in the US and the West will offset their neo-rationalism with a resurgent Orientalism - in other words they will say that "carrots and sticks" should be used to test the troublemakers and see if they are really able to have a meaningful political dialogue and eventually change their ways. The unspoken subtext in such an attitude is that you have to deal with these countries and groups as if you were dealing with animal you are trying to train: Hit them when they misbehave, and feed them to entice them to follow your lead.
The "carrots-and-sticks" approach is only a mildly different version of the previous policy of threats, attacks, sanctions and regime change. It will fail, as the former policy failed, because it is based on the assumption that the policies and approach of the US-led camp is legal, righteous and generous, and that this camp defines the rules that others in the world must abide by. This is very similar to the dynamics that defined the colonial era, which, thankfully, largely ended half a century ago - with the exception of lingering threads such as this approach to those who remain defiant in the Arab-Asian world.
Despite these misgivings, some signs of change are in the air, and they are encouraging. How far they will go and what impact they will have remain unclear. Rhetoric is the first step to action, so adversaries talking to each other is a good start, and could lead to changes in policies that reduce tensions and promote mutual well-being.

Rami G. Khouri is published twice-weekly by THE DAILY STAR.
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